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ABSTRACT: The EU has a Treaty-based obligation to promote democracy in the wider world, with a 
particular emphasis on neighbouring States. Doctrinal approaches to EU democracy promotion 
generally focus on a specific set of instruments, whereas the law of external relations underpins a 
much wider set of policies and practices relating to democracy promotion. This Article applies four 
categories of democracy promotion (on a positive/negative and express/implied axis) to a case 
study of the EU-Turkey relationship. The wider scope provided by this categorisation demonstrates 
that democracy promotion should not only be seen within the confines of “positive” measures 
such as enlargement conditionality but also by measures and practices which are often hidden 
from view. In doing so, a richer understanding of how the law of the EU’s external relations informs 
policy and practice can be gained. 
 
KEYWORDS: European Union – democracy promotion – Turkey – external relations – CFSP – norma-
tive power Europe. 
 
I. Introduction 
The EU has tasked itself with promoting democracy as a “value” in all its external rela-
tionships. The TEU lists “democracy” as one of the values upon which the EU is founded 
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and hence obliges it to uphold and promote democracy across the globe.1 As such, we 
find an expression in the Treaty of the oft-cited characterization of the Union and its 
identity as a “normative power”.2 
This Article focuses on how the legal obligation translates into the practices of EU 
democracy promotion. Since a doctrinal legal analysis of democracy promotion would 
likely only capture a select number of measures identifiable as serving this aim, casting 
a wider net enables legal scholarship to appreciate the diversity of instances where de-
mocracy promotion plays a role in EU external relations. The notion of democracy pro-
motion here is therefore wider than that associated with “activities”, which has in-
formed much recent research.3 Whilst a rich body of work in political sci-
ence/international relations scholarship has explored democracy promotion, particular-
ly since the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the TEU in 
1992, there is a need for legal scholarship to account for this phenomenon too. This is 
for three reasons. First, because the nature of “democracy” promoted by the EU (even 
accounting for its vague parameters) is intrinsically rule-based: the rule of law and hu-
man rights protection are integral components of the values of “democracy”.4 Second, 
that the instruments and conduct of the EU’s external relations are underpinned by le-
gal dynamics, whether these be contractual relations with third States (including en-
largement, trade or development) or the use of legal instruments as threats (such as 
restrictive measures (sanctions)). Third, understanding how the legal obligation of the 
EU is pursued, even in ways which are indirect or hidden within other aims, allows us to 
more fully appreciate the extent to which the EU can be characterized as a global (legal) 
actor and promoter of democracy. 
The contribution thus is to demonstrate how the wide variety of policies and prac-
tices within the context of a bilateral relationship with a third State and legal space pro-
vide a fuller understanding of democracy promotion by the EU and its claim to norma-
tivity. A four-part categorization is used, exploring positive and negative, express and 
implied instances of democracy promotion.5 
 
1 Arts 2 and 3, para. 5, TEU. 
2 See I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2002, p. 235 et seq,; I. MANNERS, The Normative Power of the European Union in a Globalized 
World, in Z. LAÏDI, EU Foreign Policy in a Globalised World, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, p. 23 et seq.; R.A. 
DEL SARTO, Normative Empire Europe: the European Union, its Borderlands, and the Arab Spring, in Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies, 2016, p. 216. 
3 See, for example, A. WETZEL, J. ORBIE, F. BOSSUYT, One of What Kind? Comparative Perspectives on the 
Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2015, p. 21 et seq. 
4 It is not always possible to distinguish “democracy” and “human rights” in EU discourse, which are 
often grouped together as “political reforms”. As such, although the focus of this Article is democracy 
promotion, this includes consideration of both human rights and the rule of law as a constituent element. 
5 As developed in P.J. CARDWELL, Mapping Out Democracy Promotion in the EU’s External Relations, in 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 2011, p. 21 et seq. 
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The case study used to demonstrate the different types of democracy promotion at 
play is the EU-Turkey relationship. The EU-Turkey relationship is one which does not 
easily in a single frame: the EU’s legal, economic and political ties with Turkey sit along-
side tensions around migration, security and democratization. The period since 2005 
forms the basis of the study, as this marked the point when EU enlargement negotia-
tions with Turkey were officially opened. But although significant, the EU-Turkey rela-
tionship is not merely one based on enlargement, given Turkey’s “dynamic economy, its 
strategic location and its important regional role”,6 which distinguishes it from all other 
(recent) candidate States.  
Contemporary relations have been partly structured by the impact of the EU-Turkey 
migration cooperation “statement” (2016) but also heightened tensions following the 
attempted coup d’état in Turkey in July 2016. The EU institutions condemned the at-
tempted coup but have expressed concern at the subsequent government crackdown 
on civil society and national institutions.7 Nevertheless, despite the turbulence, the 
depth of the bilateral economic, political and cultural relationship means that there is 
an opportunity to explore a wide variety of democracy promotion efforts. The place of 
democracy promotion and whether the EU is ready to compromise on enforcing its 
stated values is especially pertinent in light of the strategic role played by Turkey in Eu-
rope’s migration control and security agendas. 
The Article does not suggest which of the democracy promotion categories might 
have the most democratising effect on Turkey, nor whether the “democracy” being pro-
moted is example of a changing (neo-)liberal focus within Europe.8 Rather, it demon-
strates that democracy promotion should not be seen within the confines of the “positive” 
measures such enlargement process conditionality or specific funding instruments. In 
putting forward a better understanding of democracy promotion via a wider scope of 
analysis and drawing on insights from political science literature, the Article concludes 
that the EU’s claim to be a normative power may still hold, even if the values associated 
with democracy promotion efforts may be sidelined in favour of other goals, such as mi-
gration control and security. The legal dynamics that underpin EU democracy promotion 
nevertheless help us to better understand both the richness of EU external relations law 
and policy, their operationalization and relationship with democratic values. 
 
6 Communication COM(2012) 600 final of 10 October 2012 from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2012-2013, p. 16. 
7 Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2016) 366 final of 9 November 2016, Turkey 2016 Re-
port – Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2016 
Communication on EU Enlargement Policy COM(2016) 715 final, www.ec.europa.eu. 
8 A. WETZEL, J. ORBIE (eds), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005. 
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II. The “democracy” in EU democracy promotion 
The Treaty states that the EU is “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”.9 This 
translates to a commitment to “uphold and promote its values” in relations with the 
wider world.10 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced Art. 21, para. 1, TEU, which stipulates 
that the EU’s international action, “shall be guided by the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development and enlargement”. These principles include democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights. The Court of Justice has, in the EU’s internal legal or-
der, ensured that these principles are a distinctive part of general EU law.11 The values 
in the Treaty are no longer specified as those which are common to the Member States, 
but rather to the EU itself as an autonomous actor.12 Legal scholarship has explored 
what these values constitute in practical expressions of EU external relations and the 
institutions responsible for their promotion.13  
The Treaty calls for specific actions at the EU level to “safeguard its values”,14 to 
“consolidate and support democracy”15 and to “promote an international system based 
on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance”.16 This provision lays 
a foundation for the export of EU norms and, with Art. 3, para. 5, TEU, a legal basis.17 
The Treaty makes special mention of the relationship with neighbouring countries and 
links with the EU’s values (rather than shared values with the neighbours). In this re-
spect, the EU is charged with establishing “an area of prosperity and good neighbourli-
ness, founded on the values of the Union”.18 The EU’s Global Strategy and other recent 
foreign policy documents place great emphasis on “resilience” of States and societies, 
 
9 Art. 2 TEU. 
10 Art. 3, para. 5, TEU. 
11 B. DE WITTE, The EU and the International Legal Order: the Case of Human Rights, in M. EVANS, P. 
KOUTRAKOS, Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections Between the EU and the Rest of 
the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 127 et seq.  
12 P. KOUTRAKOS, EU International Relations Law, 2015, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 419. 
13 See, inter alia, A. MAGEN, The Rule of Law and its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, in 
Stanford Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 51 et seq.; M. CREMONA, Values in EU Foreign Policy, in M. 
EVANS, P. KOUTRAKOS, Beyond the Established Legal Orders, cit., p. 275 et seq., L. PECH, Rule of Law as a 
Guiding Principle of the European Union’s External Action, CLEER Working Papers, no. 3, 2012. 
14 Art. 21, para. 2, let. a), TEU. 
15 Art. 21, para. 2, let. b), TEU. 
16 Art. 21, para. 2, let. h), TEU. 
17 C. HILLION, Anatomy of EU Norm Export Towards the Neighbourhood, in P. VAN ELSUWEGE, R. PETROV, 
Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Un-
ion, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, p. 15 et seq. 
18 Art. 8, para. 1, TEU. For further exploration of the nature of “good neighbourliness”, see the con-
tributions to: D. KOCHENOV, E. BASHESKA (eds), Good Neighbourliness in the European Legal Context, Lei-
den: Brill Nijhoff, 2015. 
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particularly those in the EU neighbourhood, and make an explicit link between the 
promotion of democracy in third countries and maintaining democracy within the EU.19 
There is thus a clear, if general, mandate to promote democracy beyond the EU’s 
borders. “Democracy” is not defined in the Treaties, which is perhaps not surprising 
since the democratic nature of the EU itself is contested insofar as it is “not about over-
coming its democratic nation states, but about managing democratic interdepend-
ence”.20 Ongoing debates within the EU about how to tackle democratic “backsliding” in 
Hungary and Poland reveal the thorny nature of where the limits of democracy lie, and 
what to do about it. When transplanted to the external sphere, the challenges of the EU 
as a non-State polity promoting democracy in a third State is no less difficult. As such, 
Kurki has characterised the EU’s democracy promotion as based on a “fuzzy” framework 
when compared to the logics followed by the US, but also by other international or non-
governmental organisations.21  
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a section entitled “Provisions on Democratic Princi-
ples”. These four articles are not concerned with external democracy promotion per se. 
However, they give some insight into the values of democratic legitimacy signalled by 
Art. 21, para. 1, TEU. The provisions focus on Parliamentary accountability and repre-
sentative democracy as the foundation of the EU’s functioning.22 This reminds us (and 
recalls the argument by Manners)23 that what the EU is affects what it does externally 
as a normative actor. 
Unlike in the academic literature, within official EU discourse, “democracy support” is 
generally preferred to “democracy promotion”. The use of the former term gives less of 
an impression of a one-size-fits-all approach and recognition that the category of States 
where democracy is a subject of concern or discussion is very wide. As a consequence, as 
Pace has argued in the Mediterranean context,24 this means that EU policy-making suffers 
from incoherence in terms of objectives. In official documentation, frequent references 
are made to emphasising “common” and “shared” values between the EU and a third 
State, even in instances where the two would appear to have little in common in terms of 
democratic governance. Frequent reference is made to instruments of international law 
 
19 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, 28 June 
2016, www.europa.eu; From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 
1, 7 June 2017, www.europa.eu. 
20 J. NEYER, Justice and the Right to Justification: Conceptual Reflections, in D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BÚRCA, 
A. WILLIAMS (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit?, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 211 et seq. 
21 M. KURKI, Fuzzy Liberalism and EU Democracy Promotion: Why Concepts Matter, in A. WETZEL, J. 
ORBIE (eds), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p. 35 et seq. 
22 Art. 10, para. 1, TEU 
23 I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, cit. 
24 M. PACE, Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean, in De-
mocratization, 2009, p. 39 et seq. 
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(especially if signed by the third State), or a pre-existing legal framework with the EU (such 
as the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific States) or within the State’s 
own region as a means of signifying what values these might be. At the same time, this 
vagueness represents a recognition of a differentiation of values in a process of dialogue 
where the EU is considering deeper cooperation with a third State. But the nature of what 
values are “shared” can be varied according to the EU’s own interests. As Leino has ob-
served,25 the “universal” language can be used to promote its own objectives and there-
fore is not something genuinely shared, but a “false universal”. 
The common or shared values are thus difficult to identify in their entirety with any 
certainty, even if aspects of democracy can be crystallised into a core sub-set of values 
(as Pech has argued in the case of the rule of law).26 Taken as a whole, the difficulties 
reflect the even more fundamental question of what type of democracy the EU itself 
embodies beyond the general principles of law identified by the Court of Justice in the 
absence of a definition in the Treaty. Needless to say, the under-determination of objec-
tives has an impact on democracy promotion efforts.27 The risk with a differentiated 
approach is that the EU’s reiteration of its strong commitment to promoting democracy 
includes an in-built downgrading of democracy when other interests are at stake. 
Common/shared values can be stressed if the aim is to demonstrate that cooperation, 
rather than criticism, is sought with the third State(s) in question. The way in which the 
obligation to promote democracy and democratic values in the wider world is thus une-
ven, and perhaps unavoidably so. 
As the EU’s Global Strategy notes,28 ensuring security, economic prosperity and sta-
bility in the Mediterranean has clear and tangible benefits for the EU. The former CFSP 
High Representative explicitly made this point in terms of “respecting and promoting 
the rule of law as well as fundamental rights and freedoms not only defines the EU but 
is also in our interest”.29 The EU’s stated emphasis is on long-term, incremental changes 
rather than short-term achievements,30 though this is brought into question (to take an 
example from the case study here) by the speed at which accession negotiations were 
 
25 P. LEINO, The Journey Towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ 
as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law, in M. CREMONA, B. DE WITTE (eds), EU Foreign Relations 
Law; Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 259 et seq., p. 265. 
26 L. PECH, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: On the EU’s Limited Contribution to the Shaping of an 
International Understanding of the Rule of Law, in D. KOCHENOV, F. AMTENBRINK (eds), The European Un-
ion’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 129. 
27 M. KURKI, Fuzzy Liberalism and EU Democracy Promotion: Why Concepts Matter, cit. 
28 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, cit. 
29 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
of March 2009, www.consilium.europa.eu, p. 3. 
30 Council Conclusions of 17 November 2009 on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations, 
point 4. 
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promised in return for enhanced migration cooperation with Turkey in early 2016. It 
would be naïve to suggest that the EU engages in democracy promotion without any 
other interests at stake. The EU’s internal considerations are inherently connected to its 
external engagements, and tied to the legally-based inducements it can offer.31 The ne-
gotiations with Turkey over an arrangement to “reduce the illegal flow of migrants” offer 
specific advantages but in exchange for security assurances rather than democratic im-
provements.32 Whilst this seems to undermine the central claims of the EU as a norma-
tive power, it highlights the need to understand where else in the EU’s engagement with 
Turkey democracy promotion takes place, especially “under the radar” and beyond offi-
cial engagements with central government, to better our understanding and evaluation. 
Given the Treaty language across the EU’s foreign policy discourse about the im-
portance of democratisation and human rights, it is tempting to focus attention solely on 
those actions which are taken with the express/stated purpose of influencing the demo-
cratic development of third States. Political scientists have extensively theorised the ways 
in which norms can be transmitted from the EU to third States via their interactions. Man-
ners’ norm diffusion thesis recognises the different ways that norms transfer as a process 
including via contagion, procedural diffusion and transference.33 Norms can be trans-
ferred via long-term processes of socialization (whereby the “target” State is exposed to 
the norms and values of the EU and eventually adopts them) or by strategic calculation by 
the third State in return for a particular advantage or benefit. Schimmelfennig and Sedel-
meier conceptualized the transfer in the context of Central and Eastern Europe via the ex-
ternal incentives model (based on the logic of consequences) or the social learning model 
(based on the logic of appropriateness and domestically driven processes.34 
The analysis in this Article accepts that norms can transfer in different ways. The 
emphasis here is less how the norms are accepted or resisted by the target, but the 
processes through which they are observable. Many of the features examined can be 
understood in terms of a democracy promotion strategy on the part of the EU.35 How-
ever, it is also possible that the promotion of democracy is secondary to other aims 
pursued by the EU, or even as a by-product. That is to say that democracy promotion 
 
31 See for example the analysis of the security and normative considerations in visa liberalization 
policy in the EU’s neighbourhood: L. DELCOUR, S. FERNANDES, Visa Liberalization Processes in the EU’s East-
ern Neighbourhood: Understanding Policy Outcomes, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016, 
p. 1259 et seq. 
32 Communication COM(2016) 166 of 16 March 2016 from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the European Council and the Council on next operational steps in the EU-Turkey cooperation in 
the field of migration. 
33 I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, cit. 
34 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, U. SEDELMEIER (eds), The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005. 
35 R. YOUNGS, Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy, Brussels: Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies, 2001. 
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need not be explicitly labelled as such but can be understood to be a reflection of how 
the EU presents itself to the world and engages with third States (or, for that matter, 
within international organisations or multilateral frameworks). In doing so, neglected or 
unseen aspects of the EU putting its values into action can be observed. It must also be 
borne in mind that democracy promotion is an integral part of EU foreign and enlarge-
ment policies, but not merely that which is the prerogative of the Council and Commis-
sion. National and sub-national actors or individuals (such as MEPs) can be engaged in 
EU democracy promotion too.36 Nevertheless, the institutional focus of the analysis 
here is generally limited to the roles played by the Commission, Council or Parliament 
since these are institutions that, individually or collectively, represent the EU. 
A four-part classification is used to shed light on the different ways in which democ-
racy promotion occurs.37 A “positive” and “express” means of democracy promotion re-
fers to the dominant logic of an inducement to improve some aspect of the third State’s 
democracy. The range of inducements on offer as well as the means vary considerably 
but the underlying rationale is “reinforcement by reward”.38 Inducements may be 
couched in general terms and not “concrete” but rather steps towards reaching a par-
ticular benefit, though the promotion of democracy as the means to the end will be ex-
plicit. Though the inducement is usually offered to the government of the third State, 
this might not always be the case: direct funding to non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) by the EU is an example of positive democracy promotion as a means to achieve 
better democratic participation. Although many instances of positive democracy pro-
motion could be seen through the prism of conditionality, the scope of the category is 
wider since it is not necessarily the case that the inducement is directly tied to demo-
cratic progress only by the government. 
“Negative” and “express” democracy promotion appears to be a contradiction in 
terms, since the nature of “promotion” suggests a positive or “giving” action. But in ef-
fect it operates within the same logic as positive, express democracy promotion. That is 
to say that unless the third State improves or rectifies a situation of concern, then a 
benefit or potential benefit will be withdrawn, or the EU will seek to invoke punitive 
measures such as sanctions. The threat of doing so is an integral part of “negative” de-
mocracy promotion. One of the main differences with positive, express democracy 
promotion is that the focus is far more on the governmental organs of a third State 
than other, non-State actors.  
The analysis here accounts for instances of EU activity which can be understood as 
democracy promotion, but without explicit reference to doing so. The analysis therefore 
 
36 N. GORDON, S. PARDO, Normative Power Europe and the Power of the Local, in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2015, p. 416 et seq. 
37 P.J. CARDWELL, Mapping Out Democracy Promotion in the EU’s External Relations, cit. 
38 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, S. ENGERT, H. KNOBEL, Costs, Commitment and Compliance. The Impact of EU Demo-
cratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003, p. 496. 
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avoids the distinction of “hard” and “soft” democracy promotion39 or one that regards 
law as being only prescriptive or one-dimensional. The wide conceptualisation of de-
mocracy promotion therefore includes “implied” means by which the EU attempts to 
engage in democracy in a positive or negative way. “Positive” and “implied” democracy 
promotion refers to instances where the EU is projecting a vision of democracy and/or 
democratic values in its external relations towards a third country, even though these 
are not expressly stated as an aim. This might involve in the sharing of or exposure to 
EU values, such as invitations to join EU-led civil society networks, joint parliamentary 
assemblies or “twinning” projects; all of which are founded on the values of democratic 
participation and representation and are integral to the rule of law. 
The final category, “negative” and “implied” democracy promotion, is the most diffi-
cult to identify in terms of its contents, since it refers to instances without express ref-
erence to promoting democracy by withdrawing something, downgrading relations or 
even the threat of punitive measures. Nevertheless, the case is made here that negative 
implied democracy promotion is not only possible but already present. For example, 
the EU might imply to a third State that relations suffer because of a lack of democratic 
progress and that they could be improved by following the example of a neighbouring 
State who improved their levels of democracy (either generally or in specific areas). This 
is particularly evident within the EU’s neighbouring geographic regions of the Mediter-
ranean and Eastern Europe. 
The argument is made in this Article that all four categories of democracy promo-
tion are visible in the EU’s relationship with Turkey, and taken together, all enrich our 
understanding of contemporary democracy promotion. For the reasons explained in 
the following section, the relationship with Turkey is notable for its depth and longevity 
amongst all the EU’s links with third States. Before exploring each category in detail, the 
context and content of the relationship needs further exploration. 
III. The EU-Turkey relationship 
The EU-Turkey relationship is complex, deep and often under close scrutiny. It is above all 
longstanding: the EEC-Turkey customs agreement (1963) was among the first of its kind 
and represented an institutionalisation of the relationship long before others with non-
EEC States. Turkey has been a key focus of the development of European foreign policy, 
dating back to European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s.40 Contacts between the 
EU institutions are therefore not at the embryonic stage. Rather, institutional contacts are 
deep: Turkey is covered by “internal” EU policy (as part of a Customs Union) and external 
 
39 T. RISSE, N. BABAYAN, Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal Regional Powers, in De-
mocratization, 2015, p. 382. 
40 M.E. SMITH, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 
109-110. 
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relations via enlargement, neighbourhood policies and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). For the latter, it is both an insider (as it is offered the opportunity to partici-
pate in CFSP activities and align with Declarations) and an outsider. 
Turkey is a longstanding member of European-focussed organisations including the 
Council of Europe (since 1949), NATO (since 1952), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (since 1961), and the Conference (later the Organi-
zation) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) (since 1975). But realising 
Turkey’s ambition to join the EU has been a very slow process with relatively few “mile-
stones”. It is the only candidate where European leaders have been ambivalent or even 
openly hostile to membership,41 by questioning whether it “belongs” in Europe.42 This is 
bound up in broader questions of Islam’s place in Europe43 and populist shifts in some 
Member States which have brought Turkish (potential) membership to the fore.44 
Turkey applied for membership in 1987 but the Commission’s 1989 opinion cited 
macro-economic instabilities and continuing human rights violations after the 1980 mili-
tary coup as reasons why Turkey should not yet join. Turkey entered a Customs Union 
with the EU in 1995, but was not granted candidate status until the 1999 Helsinki Council. 
Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean have leapfrogged 
Turkey and acceded after much shorter periods, before accession negotiations eventually 
started in 2005. The accession process has not moved at a regular pace and for several 
years had seen scant progress. The ability of the EU to engage in rule transfer on political 
reforms was thus diminished.45 EU-Turkey relations suddenly became more intense, and 
intensely scrutinised, in early 2016 as a result of increasing numbers of individuals at-
tempting to reach Greece via the Turkish coast. The statement concluded between the EU 
and Turkey on migration cooperation in March 2016 came with a promise of opening en-
largement acquis chapters and reversing the stagnated pace of accession.  
The focus on migration cooperation did not however herald a shift in gear in acces-
sion negotiations. The attempted coup d’état in July 2016 and subsequent crackdown by 
the Turkish government on journalists, academics and civil society have led to increas-
 
41 These arguments have been made throughout Turkey’s candidacy, but appear most often when a 
new stage in the process is on the horizon. Most notably in recent years, President Sarkozy of France, 
who with German Chancellor Merkel blocked the opening of “chapters” in the accession process in 2011. 
He later declared that Turkey is not eligible to join because it is “in Asia Minor, not Europe”, M.B., P.P., 
Sarkozy: La Turquie dans l'UE? "Une erreur monumentale", 2 December 2015, www.europe1.fr. 
42 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union, in South Euro-
pean Society and Politics, 2005, p. 18. 
43 E. HUGHES, Turkey’s Accession to the European Union, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 165. 
44 For example, in the UK’s EU referendum in June 2016, the official Leave campaign claimed that “Tur-
key is joining the EU” and that free movement rights would be extended to 76 million Turks. The lack of pro-
gress in the enlargement negotiations, making membership only a distant prospect, was not highlighted. 
45 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The European Union and Turkey: Transforming the European Periphery into Eu-
ropean Borderlands, 2016, EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 12, 2016, p. 4. 
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ing calls (including by the European Parliament) to suspend accession negotiations.46 
Turkish leaders have been more ambivalent about whether to continue to pursue EU 
membership as a goal. Although the official position is that Turkey and the EU remain 
committed to the process, there seems little likelihood that accession negotiations will 
pick up pace in the short to medium term. Nevertheless, the numerous and wide-
ranging engagement activities (some of which are explored below) continue. Examining 
long-term democracy promotion remains a worthwhile endeavour and the actions of 
the central government need not mean that EU activities are futile. 
Under the political dominance of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) party since 2002, relations with the EU and its Member States have 
varied considerably, from high points of international cooperation activities and occasion-
al steps forward towards accession, to low points including very public disagreements, as 
demonstrated by an unprecedented diplomatic spat with Germany and the Netherlands 
in March 2017.47 Erdoğan has broken with past leaders in being more forthright about a 
more prominent role for Islam in Turkish society and critical of European countries’ 
treatment of Muslim minorities.48 As a result of European ambivalence to membership 
and its growing economic strength, Turkey’s own foreign policy has appeared to focus 
greater attention on its region, and further afield.49 Başer has characterised this shift as 
representing “a more active and ambitious” foreign policy,50 though others have claimed 
that the shift can be explained in terms of “historically changing strategies of social repro-
duction of the Ottoman and Turkish States in response to changing domestic and interna-
tional environments”.51 In any event, the emphasis on a regional focus marks the emer-
gence of Turkey itself as a normative foreign policy actor in its region, which makes Turkey 
and the EU potential competitors in the promotion of norms.52 
Enlargement is not therefore the only prism through which to see EU-Turkey rela-
tions. Similarly, democracy promotion is only one aspect of the relationship, sitting 
alongside an increasing focus on the role of Turkey in the migration “crisis” and particu-
 
46 European Parliament Resolution 2016/2993(RSP) of 24 November 2016 on EU-Turkey relations.  
47 In advance of a referendum on changes to the Turkish constitution, Germany and the Netherlands 
refused to permit Turkish Ministers to address pro-government rallies in their countries. President 
Erdoğan lambasted the governments, accusing them of Nazi-like behaviour. 
48 E. KIRDIŞ, Immoderation: Comparing the Christian Right in the US and Pro-Islamic Movement-
Parties in Turkey, in Democratization, 2016, p. 430. 
49 D. GÜNAY, Europeanization of State Capacity and Foreign Policy: Turkey in the Middle East, in Medi-
terranean Politics, 2014, p. 220 et seq.; H. TARIK OĞUZLU, Turkish Foreign Policy at the Nexus of Changing 
International and Regional Dynamics, in Turkish Studies, 2016, p. 59. 
50 E.T. BAŞER, Shift-of-Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy, in Turkish Studies, 2015, p. 305. 
51 C. HOFFMAN, C. CEMGIL, The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the So-
cial-historical Roots of Foreign Policy, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016, p. 1280. 
52 E. PARLAR DAL, Assessing Turkey's “Normative” Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region, in 
Turkish Studies, 2013, p. 709 et seq. 
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larly those fleeing neighbouring Syria. This makes the implied categories of democracy 
promotion potentially richer in content. Yet, of all the challenges, Turkish democracy 
has been a major sticking point. Turkey is ranked lower than all Member States and 
other candidates in international democracy indexes. For example, it sits at number 97 
of 167 in the world and part of the “hybrid regimes” of category according to the Econ-
omist Intelligence Unit.53 Fuat Keyman and Gümüşçü have characterised Turkey’s cur-
rent position as being at the crossroads between democratic consolidation or erosion.54 
Nevertheless, in the context of the Mediterranean, Turkey is ranked higher than most 
other States (except Israel and Tunisia) and has itself been involved in democracy pro-
motion in the region following the Arab Spring55 as a means of seeking a role as a re-
gional actor.56 Gunay finds that Turkey’s ties to the EU and candidate status allowed it 
to have greater influence over other Mediterranean States.57 
The case study of Turkey thus allows a rich exploration of the different types of de-
mocracy promotion employed by the EU over a significant time period. The uniqueness 
of the EU-Turkey relationship in terms of its longevity, depth and multiple framings 
mean that this exploration should not be regarded as how democracy promotion oper-
ates with other countries near to and far from the EU. It is also important to avoid Euro-
centric assumptions that changes in Turkey are necessarily and solely prompted by ef-
forts by the EU. In particular, the advantages on offer as part of the enlargement pro-
cess may be given as a result of other factors. The strategic role of Turkey in preventing 
migration flows to Europe and the granting of aid packages to do so is one prominent 
example, and one where the EU risks putting in danger its claim to be a normative pow-
er insofar as the questionable interpretation of international refugee law applies.58 As 
Tarık Oğuzlu has noted,  
“[t]he Europeans assume that in return for EU's financial aid to Turkey to help lessen Tur-
key's burden, opening some chapters in accession negotiations, and provision of visa-free 
travel to Turkish citizens in the Schengen area in late 2016, Turkey will likely cooperate with 
the EU in finding a remedy to the Syrian refugee crisis within Turkey's territory”.59 
 
53 Economist Intelligence Unit, Revenge of the “Deplorables”, in The Economist, 31 March 2017, 
www.eiuperspectives.economist.com. 
54 E. FUAT KEYMAN, Ş GÜMÜŞÇÜ, Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey, Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 2014. 
55 Z. ÖNIŞ, Turkey and the Arab Revolutions, in Mediterranean Politics, 2014, p. 203 et seq. 
56 B. AYATA, Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World, in Journal of European Integration, 2015, 
p. 95 et seq. 
57 D. GÜNAY, Europeanization of State Capacity and Foreign Policy: Turkey in the Middle East, cit., p. 231. 
58 I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe Reconsidered, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2006, p. 194. 
59 H. TARIK OĞUZLU, Turkish Foreign Policy at the Nexus of Changing International and Regional Dy-
namics, cit., p. 64. 
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Furthermore, that any moves towards “Europeanisation” (including what we might 
see as consolidating democracy) may not only be accounted for by EU conditionality 
and incentive-based models, but domestic drivers of change, including from business 
groups, NGOs and civil society.60 It is important not to see democracy promotion mere-
ly through the relationship between the national government and the EU institutions, or 
the rhetoric of political leaders. Rather, as some of the instances examined below 
demonstrate, the “bottom up” approach which engages entities other than the central 
government with the EU show on the one hand the wide scope of democracy promo-
tion and the importance of focusing on democratisation as a long-term process.  
IV. Analysing democracy promotion in the EU-Turkey relationship 
The categorisation of democracy promotion with third States was introduced in section II 
above. The following sections illustrate examples of democracy promotion across the pos-
itive/negative and express/implied categories in the case of the EU-Turkey relationship. 
iv.1. Positive/express democracy promotion 
This dimension to the EU’s democracy promotion is the most readily identifiable. This 
category covers self-standing or over-arching measures designed to increase, in some 
way, democracy and democratic development in Turkey.  
The enlargement process is the prime example in this category. Enlargement is a legal 
process according to which, as Art. 49 TEU makes clear, begins with the application of a 
“European State” to become a member. The process of joining is, however, owned and 
managed by the EU institutions which ultimately assess whether the State is ready to join. 
Enlargement is included in this category because it is the most obvious way in which a 
specific advantage (full EU membership) can reward democratic progress (though for Eu-
ropean States only). Nevertheless, as a wide-ranging and multifaceted process, aspects of 
the enlargement process can also be understood as fitting into other categories too. It is 
therefore important to distinguish the elements which are positive/express here. Further, 
as Turkey is not (yet) a Member State, the emphasis here is on enlargement as a process 
rather than a fait accompli. A linear account of enlargement alone is unlikely to account 
for domestic change in Turkey over the longer term, especially since the length of time 
which has passed since Turkey’s original application to join.61  
At the most general level, each of the significant milestones of the enlargement 
process (accepting an application for membership, recognising a country as a candidate 
 
60 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union, cit.; G. YILMAZ, 
EU Conditionality Is Not the Only Game in Town! Domestic Drivers of Turkey's Europeanization, in Turkish 
Studies, 2014, p. 303 et seq. 
61 N. TOCCI, Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?, in South European Society and 
Politics, 2005, p. 73 et seq. 
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and beginning the formal process of negotiation) rests on an evaluation of the level of 
democracy in a third State. The requirement of a democratic system of government as a 
prerequisite to even consider an application for EU membership was established long-
before the EU developed specific approaches to democracy promotion. In 1978, the Eu-
ropean Council specified that representative democracy is an “essential element” for 
membership and was tested first in the accession negotiations of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal.62 The Copenhagen Criteria (1993) set out the democratic credentials for future 
Member States more comprehensively. 
The recognition of Turkey’s EU candidature in 1999 immediately spurred a period of 
democratic reforms and constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002.63 Two con-
crete examples are provided by the abolition of the death penalty, which is considered by 
the EU to be an essential element of a fully democratic State, and the provision of cultural 
rights (in broadcasting and education) for the Kurdish minority. Both are directly linked to 
progress in the enlargement process and were achieved via a legislative package in 2002, 
as a direct result of the 1999 recognition of candidate status.64 Much of the literature on 
the EU and Turkey published in the mid-2000s focussed on the path Turkey seemed to be 
taking towards EU membership, however differentiated from other candidates past and 
present.65 Yet for Turkey, the evolution has been from one where fulfilling the entry crite-
ria would result in membership, to one where even fulfilling all the criteria does not if the 
EU does not have the capacity to “absorb” the new Member State.66 
Democratisation is not a tick box operation, and the EU institutions and Member 
States were criticised for not ensuring the consolidation of democracy in Romania and 
Bulgaria before their accession.67 The steps of the enlargement process that, at this 
stage, can be measured by the opening and closing of more than 30 chapters of the ac-
quis therefore illustrate the “positive” incentive on offer. Legal scholars have criticised 
the shortcomings of conditionality as failing to embed democracy fully before EU mem-
bership.68 But there is little doubt within the enlargement process of the central place 
of democratic development as a key factor. This is particularly the case for Turkey: the 
 
62 N. GHAZARYAN, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 118. 
63 E. ÖZBUDUN, Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004, in Turkish Studies, 2007, p. 179 et 
seq.; G. GÜNLÜK-ŞENESEN, H. KIRIK, The AKP Era: Democratization or Resecuritization?, in Research and Poli-
cy on Turkey, 2016, p. 75 et seq. 
64 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, S. ENGERT, H. KNOBEL, Costs, Commitment and Compliance. The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, cit., p. 508. 
65 For example, H. ARIKAN, Turkey and the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
66 A.R. USUL, Is There Any Hope of the Revival of EU-Turkey Relations in the “New Era”?, in Turkish 
Studies, 2014, p. 289. 
67 A.B. SPENDZHAROVA, M.A. VACHUDOVA, Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and 
Romania after EU Accession, in West European Politics, 2012, p. 39 et seq. 
68 D. KOCHENOV, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, The Hague: Kluwer, 2008. 
Explaining the EU’s Legal Obligation for Democracy Promotion: The Case of the EU-Turkey Relationship 877 
Commission’s 2015 annual report on Turkey’s progress in the enlargement process de-
votes 20 of the 88 pages to political reforms, compared to only five for economic re-
forms, before even the specific acquis are considered. Within the latter, several can be 
seen as fitting with the positive/express category. In particular, chapter 23 on the judici-
ary and fundamental rights states that, “[a] proper functioning judicial system and ef-
fective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fun-
damental rights in law and in practice” and goes on to list Turkey’s successes and fail-
ures in this respect.69 In the opening paragraphs, the Commission comments that:  
“Opening benchmarks for Chapters 23 [judiciary and fundamental rights] and 24 [justice, 
freedom and security] on the rule of law still need to be defined so as to provide Turkey 
with a roadmap for reforms in this essential area. Turkey can accelerate the pace of nego-
tiations by advancing in the fulfilment of the benchmarks, meeting the requirements of the 
negotiating framework and by respecting its contractual obligations towards the EU”.70 
Previous reports have made comments on similar lines. Whilst the Commission 
might be accused of singling out Turkey by “over attentiveness”,71 the explicit linking of 
progress with pace of reforms makes the positive/express categorisation of this type of 
democracy promotion clear. 
Although the enlargement process provides the foundation for the contemporary EU-
Turkey relationship, other instances of positive/express democracy promotion are pre-
sent too. Turkey is one of only a handful of countries in which more than 25 projects have 
been run under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) pro-
gramme (Nepal, Russia, Venezuela and States in the Western Balkans are others) which 
effectively allows the EU to engage in positive, express democracy promotion in a third 
State without the permission of the host government.72 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
have termed this bottom-up approach “linkage” which facilitates contact beyond the level 
of central government departments.73 The ongoing civil society dialogue between Turkey 
and the EU awarded grants to 199 projects between 2006-2009 and is co-funded by the 
EU and Turkey.74 Whilst the legal basis is separate to the enlargement process, the dia-
logue offers an insight for the EU institutions which in turn informs the Commission’s re-
 
69 Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2015) 216 final of 10 November 2015, Turkey 2015 Re-
port – Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2015 
Communication on EU Enlargement Policy COM(2015) 611 final, www.ec.europa.eu, p. 55. 
70 Ibid., p. 4. 
71 C. BALKIR, M. AKNUR, Different Trajectories yet the Same Substance: Croatia and Turkey, in A. WETZEL, J. 
ORBIE (eds), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015, p. 85 et seq. 
72 R. YOUNGS, Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy, cit., p. 31. 
73 S. LAVENEX, F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to 
Governance?, in Democratization, 2011, p. 885 et seq. 
74 C. BALKIR, M. AKNUR, Different Trajectories yet the Same Substance: Croatia and Turkey, cit., p. 103. 
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ports on Turkey’s readiness for membership.75 The EU deals directly with NGOs as “hu-
man rights defenders” by issuing grants for projects on developing civil society, often with 
a technical (and thus less ostensibly political) focus. The EU has adopted a “local strategy” 
on Turkey which points to areas where Turkish democracy and the protection of human 
rights is believed to be lacking.76 As these two examples demonstrate that posi-
tive/express democracy promotion instruments are fully in evidence here, the analysis 
now turns to express measures which are negative, rather than positive. 
iv.2. Negative/express democracy promotion 
A promotion measure which is negatively expressed generally refers to the means the 
EU has at its disposal which can be engaged to withdraw a benefit it offers to a third 
State, in order to prompt rectification of an issue of concern. In a sense, these are the 
“stick” counterparts to the “carrots” in the previous section within the enlargement pro-
cess. It is expressed in the Commission’s reports on Turkey that progress in the en-
largement process, towards the end goal of becoming a Member State, cannot be 
achieved without democratic improvement. As such, positive and negative efforts form 
a “push-pull” effect, which is also subject to changes over time, especially in the drawn-
out case of Turkish membership.77  
The enlargement process thus incorporates negative/express democracy promo-
tion. Official criticism of Turkey by the EU institutions or Member States is often explicit-
ly linked to a stalling of the enlargement process (and a reminder of the economic ben-
efits of EU membership). Examples of this include aspects of the local strategy on hu-
man rights and democracy and negative judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights against Turkey78 which then feed into the Commission’s evaluation of progress 
and, in turn, the Council’s decision to open chapters for negotiations.79 Perceived back-
sliding on democratic progress, such as floating the return of the death penalty by the 
 
75 Communication (COM)2016 166, cit., p. 13. 
76 European Union local strategy in Turkey to support and defend Human Rights Defenders (HRDs), 
European Union Local Strategy to Support and Defend Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 2015, 
www.avrupa.info.tr. 
77 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union, in Middle East Studies, 
1998, p. 255; A.R. USUL, Is There any Hope of the Revival of EU-Turkey Relations in the “New Era”?, cit. 
78 The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not 
an EU instrument but all candidates are expected to be signatories. Turkey ratified the Convention in 
1953, but has been one of the countries found most regularly to have breached its rights by the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights. The Turkish government issued a derogation from the Convention in July 2016 
following the attempted coup d’état. See further, B. BAGLAYAN, Turkey Declares State of Emergency and 
Derogates from ECHR After Failed Coup d’État, in Leiden Law Blog, 8 August 2016, leidenlawblog.nl.  
79 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The European Union and Turkey: Transforming the European Periphery into Eu-
ropean Borderlands, cit., pp. 5-6. 
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government, is generally followed by a warning from the EU institutions that this would 
prevent or disrupt negotiations.80 
Usually, the means by which this type of democracy promotion is visible is in the 
EU’s international agreements with third countries. Since the growth in external agree-
ments during the 1990s, the EU has insisted on incorporating democracy and human 
rights clauses as essentials elements in its agreements with third States.81 The clauses 
are typically worded to cover “substantial violations” for which procedures of “special 
urgency” may be engaged including the suspension of the agreement. These clauses 
are heralded as a key factor in the practical application of normative power EU. In reali-
ty, activation is rare and the Commission admits that “dialogue and persuasion” and 
“positive action” is preferred to “penalties”.82 
The Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey (Ankara Agreement) does 
not include a human rights clause. Whilst this may not have been surprising at the initial 
entry into force of the agreement in 1964, the Association Council decision of 1995 es-
tablishing a customs union did not do so either.83 Although the issue was “hotly debat-
ed”84 such clauses only became the norm in the period after 199585 and were not with-
out legal controversy, as Portugal unsuccessfully challenged the inclusion of human 
rights clauses in agreements in the Court of Justice.86 However, Turkey is part of the Eu-
ro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) programme which includes a human rights 
clause as an essential element.87 Since Turkey is unusual amongst the EuroMed part-
 
80 S. ERKUŞ, EU Remains Against Death Penalty in Turkey, in Hurriyet Daily News, 16 February 2015, 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com. 
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law, underpins the internal and international policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element 
of this Agreement”. 
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84 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Human Rights and De-
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ners as the only one involved in an enlargement process,88 there was no need for a 
specific EuroMed Association Agreement as with the other partners. 
Turkey has not been the target of any restrictive measures (sanctions) by the EU, 
which since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon have become ever more preva-
lent as a feature of EU external relations.89 As a third State, there is nothing that would 
prevent the imposition of sanctions by the EU if circumstances dictated, but there 
would need to be a serious deterioration in the democracy or human rights situation. 
The first step would likely be a halt to the enlargement negotiations. To date, this has 
not occurred. Whilst the EU has been critical of “backsliding”90 in Turkish democracy for 
several years, this criticism has not prevented the EU and its Member States seeking 
enhanced migration cooperation (which eventually took the form of a “statement”)91 
with Turkey since early 2016. This demonstrates that whilst the EU institutions might 
engage in criticism and impose restrictive measures on third States, the political reali-
ties mean than a highly differentiated approach is followed. In summary, nega-
tive/express democracy promotion is therefore primarily evident in the EU-Turkey rela-
tionship within the context of the enlargement process. 
iv.3. Positive/implied democracy promotion 
In this category, democracy promotion which is less tied to specific instruments to 
reach a certain goal, can be seen through the more gradual projection of values to-
wards a third State. As an example of the EU’s normative power at work, we expect to 
see here a sharing of values but without express demands. 
Hence, a dividing line can be drawn between the express demands on Turkey via 
the enlargement process (positive/express), and the more gradual process of European-
 
88 The Partnership was relaunched as the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, and States including 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro were also included in the framework. 
89 P.J. CARDWELL, The Legalisation of European Union Foreign Policy and the Use of Sanctions, in Cam-
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90 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The European Union and Turkey: Transforming the European Periphery into Eu-
ropean Borderlands, cit., p. 7. 
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therefore the judicial review procedure under Art. 263 could not be used. Furthermore, the view of the 
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isation via multi-level engagement with Turkey.92 Europeanisation is not a singular con-
cept, and given its malleability, particular readings could apply to other categories un-
der examination in this Article. The particular reading of Europeanisation as understood 
here is, “the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to 
which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their do-
mestic rule structures”.93 This type of Europeanisation emerged as a characterisation of 
what happens to actors (including Member States) within the EU, but has since been 
developed into a means of understanding what happens beyond the EU’s borders.94 It 
is sometimes understood as a “bottom up” approach,95 which makes its characteristics 
appropriate to be included in the positive/implied category. Whilst this might be seen as 
little different to the instruments detailed in the positive/express category above, in-
stances in this implied category work in a different, more subtle way. Although the ex-
amples cited within this category are also covered by the enlargement process, since 
they are all commented upon in the enlargement reports, the claim here is that they 
would be likely to exist anyway because of the nature of Turkey as a large, neighbouring 
State with whom the EU will obviously (need to) engage with.  
Many of the instances included here also apply to other neighbourhood States in 
Eastern Europe and to a more limited extent, in the Mediterranean. Europeanisation is 
expressed through the providing of domestic incentives and a “sensitizing” of exposure 
to EU values to domestic actors. In practice, positive/implied democracy promotion en-
gages both governmental, public organisations and NGO/civil society bodies though of-
ten in different ways. The common thread running through the numerous instances of 
the involvement and inclusion of the EU in Turkish civil society, directly with Parliamen-
tary groups, NGOs and institutions contributes to projecting a vision of liberal democra-
cy by exposure. This also includes the place of minorities96 and women97 in society, and 
well as more institutional-level initiatives, such as the inclusion of Turkey in the Europe-
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an Network of Ombudsmen.98 Therefore, this category captures ongoing processes 
which are often missed by the focus on Turkey’s “macro-political deficiencies” in meet-
ing the Copenhagen criteria for enlargement.99 
Two further examples (governmental and non-governmental) are as follows. First, 
Turkey and other candidate/neighbouring States are invited to align with CFSP Declara-
tions. Declarations are not legally enforceable, and the third States have no input into 
their content, but aligning States confirm that they will adjust national policies to confirm 
with the text. The Declarations are usually critical of third States, with the most frequent 
points of contention relating to democracy, the rule of law or human rights (such as un-
fair/illegitimate elections, treatment of minorities or use of the death penalty).100 Turkey 
has aligned itself with approximately 60 percent of Declarations since 2005, though the 
annual rate has ranged between 40 and 80 percent. Whilst this practice is also comment-
ed on in the enlargement reports (as evidence of the required adaptation of national for-
eign policy to the CFSP), this process is also an example of sensitising the third countries 
to values that the EU seeks to promote. Whilst many of the Declarations seem anodyne, 
alignment might be domestically controversial in terms of the subject matter. For in-
stance, for Declarations marking International Day against Homophobia, Turkey has 
sometimes aligned but more frequently has not. Thus, though the text of Declaration 
might be very generally worded, the very process of inviting Turkey and others to align is 
an implied promotion of what the EU considers to be part of “its” democratic values, 
whether or not the third State aligns. The content is thus anything but anodyne for the 
third country in question in terms of how it wants to project itself to the wider world: ex-
pressing shared values with the EU or making a strategic calculation to do so. 
Second, at the non-governmental level, Noutcheva has highlighted Europeanisation 
as societal mobilisation and empowerment, as an alternative to élite empowerment.101 
This relies on accounting for both the EU’s structural power and actorness, which permits 
understanding the role of the EU (across its institutions) as a diffuser of ideas. She makes 
the distinction between material assistance (which was covered in the positive/express 
category above) and the “ideational backing of protest events triggered by government 
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policies that fall short of democratic norms”.102 In practice, the EU’s press releases on 
events and officials’ meetings with representatives of social movements risks destabilising 
relations with the government (which has certainly been the case with Turkey) but is a 
means of positively implying certain democratic values including plurality of political pro-
cesses, rights of minorities etc. With these examples in mind, positive/implied democracy 
promotion here is expressed partly, though not exclusively, through the enlargement pro-
cess but also through the frameworks for relations with neighbouring States. 
iv.4. Negative/implied democracy promotion 
The final category of EU democracy promotion is the least readily identifiable since it 
involves looking beyond the actual or potential use of negative means, to instances 
where the negative dimension to democracy promotion is indirectly used. Covered here 
are instances where the EU has attempted to export its model of democracy or values, 
but in a way which is both masked by other aims and which purports to take away 
some perceived benefit to the third State. In a sense, the behaviour of the EU could be 
characterised as being “passive aggressive”.103 In other words, democracy promotion is 
present as an aim but hidden from view which makes it difficult to readily regard it as a 
singular “strategy” on the part of the EU. 
As previously noted, it could be said that the existence of the human rights suspen-
sion clauses could fit within this category, since the EU institutions admit that these 
would only be triggered as a very last resort. The presence of these clauses function 
more as a threat for potential use. However, this category is much more open-textured. 
The negative/implied category points to instances where the target country in question 
is alerted to the fact that the EU is pursuing deeper cooperation (with the assumption of 
certain advantages to be gained by that country) with other, usually neighbouring, 
countries. The negative aspect is therefore that there is something in terms of its level 
of democracy which is preventing it from receiving such advantages that the EU is pre-
pared to give. The implied aspect is that it may not be done using express words. In 
some cases, the EU has used CFSP Declarations against countries which imply that neg-
ative effects of a poor relationship with the EU (because of a lack of democracy) prevent 
that country from enjoying the type of relationship or benefits the EU has to offer. Bela-
rus is a clear example where this approach has been followed.  
With Turkey, the EU does not generally engage in the open criticism of the country 
beyond official documentation such as the enlargement reports. As such, the clearest 
example here is the pursuit of enlargement negotiations with other States, which ap-
plied after Turkey but joined before it and from a lower level of economic development 
(of which Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia stand out as examples). Of course, since this is 
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implied then the reason may only be partly related to democracy, especially in the case 
of Turkey, the lack of progress towards full recognition of the government of Cyprus is a 
noted sticking point. But in response to Turkish complaints that it has been treated less 
favourably than other candidates, official speeches and documents from the EU institu-
tions imply that the sticking points are not merely formal ones which can be resolved in 
a straightforward fashion.  
With this in mind, this category can therefore include instances where there is no 
specific “box” to be ticked, and thus can be distinguished from, in particular, the nega-
tive/express category. To give a practical example, on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) rights, the EU’s comments on Turkey are less on the formal nature 
of legal protection for minorities, but the lack of an “atmosphere of tolerance” around 
the enforcement and recognition of rights.104 Therefore, the implication is that this 
slows the enlargement process without being framed explicitly as such (if it was, this 
would move into the negative/express category). But because it is not explicit, this prac-
tice speaks to the wider Turkey-specific issue of being seen as a European country ca-
pable of closer relations. The implication is that this enforcement of rights is expected 
of a European country, despite the continued lack of such enforcement in countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
V. Conclusion 
This Article has sought to demonstrate, via the case study of Turkey, that the putting into 
practice of the Treaty obligation to promote democracy should not be viewed in a narrow 
way, with only mechanisms specifically flagged as “democracy promotion” tools as the on-
ly ones which “count”. Rather, there are a host of means by which the EU attempts to 
promote or support democracy in third countries and not all of them follow a singular, 
defined strategy. Some of these means are specific to the EU as a particular kind of inter-
national, non-State actor. Needless to say, all are likely to have varying levels of success 
and the EU cannot and should not be understood as an organisation whose raison d’être 
is promoting democracy, despite what the Treaty text might indicate.  
The nature of democracy promotion by the EU is frequently criticised for its vague-
ness and incoherence. But the nature of the EU as a unique, supranational entity means 
that such analysis risks falling into the trap of treating it as we would a nation State. 
Leaving aside the difficulties involved in forming a coherent vision of what kind of de-
mocracy should be promoted, it is possible to see that the fusion and interchangeability 
of the language of human rights and the respect for the rule of law within the EU’s con-
ception of democracy is a reflection of the EU’s own legal order. Furthermore, the ways 
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in which the positive and negative measures are used are fundamentally legal in char-
acter, even if their deployment is often constrained by political considerations. 
The case study of Turkey demonstrates what the EU does towards a neighbouring 
country where the enlargement process is a significant but not the only frame for the 
relationship, in express, implied, positive and negative terms. As a neighbourhood and 
potential EU Member State, Turkey’s situation and relationship is not fully replicated by 
any other State in the neighbourhood or beyond. The EU’s engagement with Turkey can 
be exhibit features of democracy promotion across all four categories. The instances 
and weightings of positive/negative and express/implied democracy promotion are var-
ied. Turkey’s economic strength and importance to the EU for tackling, in particular, 
challenges in migration exert a strong influence on the desire and ability of the EU to 
engage in the types of democracy promotion that might be found towards other States. 
And yet, the declining prospects of Turkish EU membership, increased fractiousness at 
the official government level and prioritisation of migration/security-focussed goals 
within the relationship exert strong effects on how democracy promotion is operation-
alized. Part of this is the role the EU plays in fulfilling the other goals of the Treaty, in-
cluding the security and well-being of its citizens, which has resulted in using measures 
which should (according to the EU’s own discourse) be tied more closely to democratic 
progress, such as visa liberalization. The pursuit of migration control and security has 
taken headline precedence over the promotion of democracy, and used as a catalyst to 
promise Turkey greater progress along the path of enlargement.  
However, what the analysis here has shown is that the multitude of ways and 
means that the EU has at its disposal to (attempt to) promote democracy in a third 
country offers an opportunity to understand the EU as a multifaceted international ac-
tor. Much democracy promotion is not subject to the potentially rapidly changing state 
of relations between the highest levels of government in Turkey and the EU institutions. 
The wider scope of analysis of democracy promotion demonstrates that this does not 
fatally undermine the characterisation of the EU as a normative power since the less 
visible, implied democracy promotion aspects remain, even when attention is focussed 
on the “headline” issues. 
The uniqueness of the EU’s relationship with Turkey means that the instances of 
democracy promotion in all four of the categories are unlikely to be fully replicated in 
any other relationship. Herein lies the limitation to the case study used here. Neverthe-
less, it is instructive in terms of the EU’s other relationships and particularly those 
around the neighbourhood in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. Since Turkey is 
the only country with an enlargement perspective, however distant, then if the EU is not 
successful in promoting values in the country then it would seem to undermine any 
chances to do so with other States. Rather, the danger is that the Turkish case shows 
the democracy promotion efforts to be hollow and easily waived, thus undermining the 
EU’s credibility in the region, at home and as a global actor. However, the particular na-
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ture of the EU as a non-State actor means that the aspects of democracy promotion 
which are less immediately visible, and particularly those which are implied rather than 
express, need to be taken seriously in evaluating what kind of an actor the EU is, and 
whether it meets its Treaty goals. 
